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SQUARING M'NAGHTEN WITH PRECEDENT
-AN HISTORICAL NOTE
HARVEY WINGO*
The famous advisory opinion of M'Naghten's Case' has often
been viewed as establishing a new test for insanity in England.
* Editors Note: The test of criminal responsibility recognized in the overwhelming
majority of Anglo-American jurisdictions, including South Carolina,is the M'Naghten
rule. Prior to 1886, South Carolina had followed a rather vague test of insanity which left,
with little guidance, the question of criminal responsibility to the jury. See State v. Stark,
I Strat. 479 (1847). In State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439 (1886), the South Carolina Supreme
Court. expressly approving the test authorized by the opinion of the English judges, in
answer to the question of the House of Lords growing out of the M'Naghten Case, used
the following formulation:
In order to relieve himself from responsibility for a criminal act by reason of
mental unsoundness, he (the prisoner) must show that he was under a mental
delusion by reason of mental disease, and that at the time of the act he did not
know that the act he committed was wrong, or criminal, or punishable, either
the one or the other. Because, notwithstanding his mind may be diseased, if he
is still capable of forming a correct judgment as to the nature of the act, as to
its being morally or legally wrong, he is still responsible for his act and punish-
able as if no mental disease existed at all. 24 S.C. at 445.
There has been little change or elaboration of the test since Bundy. More recent
statements differ only in length, defining the test as ". . the mental capacity or the want
of it sufficient to distinguish moral or legal right from moral or legal wrong." State v.
Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 169, 121 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 979 (1962).
See also State v. Allen, 231 S.C. 391, 98 S.E.2d 826 (1957); State v. Fuller, 229 S.C. 439,
9:3 S.E.2d 463 (1956); State v. Keller, 224 S.C. 257, 78 S.E.2d 373 (1953); State v. Gardner,
219 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (1951); State v. Gilstrap, 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E.2d 163 (1944).
The most recent challenge to South Carolina's use of the M'Naghten rule came in
State v. Cannon, 260 S.C. 537, 197 S.E.2d 678 (1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S.
Nov. 20, 1973), when the court was asked to abandon the rule as a means of establishing
legal sanity. The court's response to this suggestion was unequivocal:
It would serve no useful purpose in this opinion to rehash the merits and demer-
its of the M'Naghten rule. We are aware of the alternatives which some courts
have adopted, but are not convinced that the other rules set forth a better
ormula for determining whether a person accused of crime should be excused
because of his mental condition. It should be comforting to those who attack the
M'Naghten rule to realize that a layman jury, regardless of the rule recited,
normally takes a common sense approach and determines whether the accused
person is, first, guilty or not guilty, and if guilty, whether his mental condition
is such that he ought to be excused of the crime because of his mental condition.
We adhere to the M'Naghten rule. 260 S.C. at 548-49, 197 S.E.2d at 682 (empha-
sis added).
It is hoped that this article, by putting M'Naghten in its proper historical context, will
aid the practitioner in gaining an insight into the M'Naghten rule.
* B.A., Birmingham - Southern College; M.A., J.D., Vanderbilt University. Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
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One view, held by Chief Justice Warren Burger, has quite prop-
erly emphasized the historical significance of the case:
"[O]bsolete is the wrong term to apply to M'Naghten, unless we
say that the Magna Charter [sic] is obsolete . . . . [E]ach of
them is incomplete and would not be adequate for today. Each
needs something more .. *"2 Burger apparently sees
M'Naghten as a great stride forward in the historical develop-
ment of insanity as a defense because it actually marked the
abandonment of the right and wrong test for insanity. "The
M'Naghten test," he has noted, "does not even use the word
'right.' "' Two questions are raised, however, by such a reading
of M'Naghten: (1) Is the M'Naghten test really not the "right and
wrong" test that has been so unmercifully condemned by so
many? (2) Did M'Naghten work an abrupt change in the test for
insanity in England?
While it is true that M'Naghten rejected any existing English
precedent for use of a standard which focused on the offender's
ability to know right from wrong in the abstract, the M'Naghten
judges, in announcing and explaining their test for determining
legal insanity, did not cast aside the "right and wrong" terminol-
ogy:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter
part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally
been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the
difference between right and wrong: which mode, though rarely,
if ever, leading to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we con-
ceive, so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as
when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and
wrong in respect to the very act with which he is charged.'
While the actual statement of the test itself, as noted by Chief
2. Burger, Panel Discussion - Psychiatry and the Law, 32 F.R.D. 481, 560 (1962)
(Proceedings os the Annual Judicial Conference of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of the United
States).
:3. Id. See also Burger, P.,chiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 FED. PROBATION,
,Jue 1964. at 4.
4. 8 Eng. Rep. at 722-23.
[Vol. 26
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss1/4
M'NAGHTEN
Justice Burger, does not include the word "right," the explana-
tion as to how the test should be put to the jury does specifically
employ a "right and wrong" formulation of the standard. The
question, the M'Naghten court said, should be put with "refer-
ence to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the
very act with which he is charged."5 Thus, even if it could be said
that the case marked the abandonment of what may have been
previously an abstract "right and wrong" standard, the test
adopted by the judges in M'Naghten was clearly one which still
looked to the offender's ability to know right from wrong, if only
as to the act charged.
A second, more interesting problem raised by contemporary
interpretations of M'Naghten is whether M'Naghten actually
represents a departure from existing precedent in its statement
of the test for insanity. A close reading of the language quoted
above indicates that the M'Naghten judges were apparently reaf-
firming what they believed to be the established English test for
insanity, merely wishing to emphasize that the test should be put
to the jury in terms of the particular act charged rather than in
the abstract. It must be conceded that there is a great difference
between the two standards - knowledge of right and wrong in the
abstract and knowledge of right and wrong with respect to the
particular act charged - and far too frequently the distinction
has been ignored.' Nevertheless, the M'Naghten judges seem to
have concluded that the latter approach had long been intended
by the courts in England, despite the general "mode of putting
[iti to the jury . . . which . . . rarely, if ever, [had misled] the
jury."' 7 They passed over the significant difference between the
two instructions as though they felt that English juries had al-
ways understood that they were to determine the offender's abil-
ity to know right from wrong as to the act charged even if the
instruction were phrased in terms of knowing right from wrong in
the abstract.
An examination of some of the more important pre-
M'Naghten cases involving the insanity issue will aid in deter-
5. Id. at 723.
6. See, e.g., Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Crimi-
nal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical
SurL'v'. 54 CAl.. L. REV. 1241 (1966).
7. 8 Eng. Rep. at 722-23. This statement is perhaps the most remarkable statement
in the case, as will be demonstrated shortly.
1974]
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mining whether the M'Naghten judges were correct in concluding
that the test as formulated by them had already been established
by precedent. In Arnold's Case,8 decided in 1724, Judge Tracy of
the Court of Common Pleas charged the jury in part as follows:
That he shot, and that wilfully [is proved]: but whether mali-
ciously, that is the thing: that is the question; whether this man
hath the use of his reason and sense? If he was under the visita-
tion of God, and could not distinguish between good and evil,
and did not know what he did, though he committed the great-
est offence, yet he could not be guilty of any offence against any
law whatsoever; for guilt arises from the mind, and the wicked
will and intention of man. If a man be deprived of his reason,
and consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty. . .. On
the other side, we must be very cautious. . it must be a man
that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and
doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a
brute, or a wild beast . . . therefore I must leave it to your
consideration, whether the condition this man was in, as it is
represented to you on one side, or the other, doth shew a man,
who knew what he was doing, and was able to distinguish
whether he was doing good or evil, and understood what he
did. . . [aInd if you believe he was sensible, and had the use
of his reason, and understood what he did, then he is not within
the exemptions of the law, but is subject to punishment as any
other person."
A challenge to draw from this instruction a specific test for deter-
mining legal insanity would be foolishly accepted. Unfortunately,
the case has generally been cited as establishing a so-called "wild
beast" test by reason of the use of that term at one point in the
instruction. The charge has been more accurately described by
Glueck as "an excellent illustration of the kind of hotch-potch
handed out in judicial charges to juries, in this field."' 0 Glueck
saw the "wild beast" reference as only one of a number of at-
tempts by Judge Tracy to "help the jury decide the vexing ques-
tion of where to draw the line in insanity cases between responsi-
bility and irresponsibility."" A careful reading of the charge in
Arnold's Case indicates, however, that there was some support for
the M'Naghten formulation as early as 1724. There are no less
8. 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
9. Id. at 764-65 (emphasis added).
10. S. OIAECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 139 n.2 (1925).
11. Id. See also, H. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 21 n.24 (1933).
[Vol. 26
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than five references to the question of whether the defendant
knew or understood what he was doing or, in M'Naghten terms,
whether he knew "the nature and quality of the act he was
doing.' 2 While in one instance Judge Tracy submitted the ques-
tion of whether Arnold could "distinguish between good and
evil," he later modified or expanded this instruction by posing the
question in terms of Arnold's ability "to distinguish whether he
was doing good or evil.' 3 This particular guideline for the jury
focused upon the knowledge of right and wrong as to the particu-
lar act charged.
Perhaps the case most frequently cited as establishing the
abstract "right and wrong" standard is Ferrers' Case," decided
in 1760. The Solicitor General, in addressing the House of Lords,
explained the insanity defense more nearly in terms of whether
the defendant was capable of knowing right from wrong in the
abstract. If, he said, the defendant had a "competent use [of his
reason] sufficient to have restrained those passions, which pro-
duced the crime; if there be thought and desion; a faculty to
distinguish the nature of actions; to discern the difference be-
tween moral good and evil, '" then he would be criminally respon-
sible for his act. Interestingly, while employing the "right and
wrong" test in its abstract form here, the Solicitor General also
used language that at least borders on the irresistible impulse
concept in his reference to reason "sufficient to have restrained
those passions, which produced the crime."'" Or, this specific
reference to the particular crime, coupled with the language of
the "good and evil" formula, could have been an effort to tie the
formula to the crime charged. This notion certainly could have
been the purport of the very next paragraph:
My lords, the question therefore must be asked; is the noble
prisoner at the bar to be acquitted from the guilt of murder, on
account of insanity? It is not pretended to be a constant general
insanity. Was he under the power of it, at the time of the offence
committed? Could he, did he, at that time, distinguish between
good and evil? 7
12. 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
1:3. 16 How. St. Tr. at 695.
14. 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760).
15. Id. at 947-48 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 947.
17. Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
1974]
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Of course, the primary emphasis here is on whether the alleged
insanity overpowered the accused at the time the particular of-
fense was committed. Expressed differently, however,.the import
is that the mental disorder need only affect the accused's ability
to distinguish good and evil at the very moment he committed the
crime. Was he able to realize, at that moment, that he was doing
evil? This formulation could be exactly the kind of instruction the
M'Naghten judges had in mind when they concluded that the
manner of submitting the insanity defense to juries in the past
had "rarely, if ever [led to] any mistake with the jury."' 8
Probably the most often quoted of the earlier English cases
in the field of insanity is Hadfield's Case, '9 where Thomas Erskine
made his famous appeal for the defense in terms which foresha-
dowed the "disease-product" test of Durham v. United States.20
Erskine's oratory apparently so impressed the Chief Justice, Lord
Kenyon, who presided at the trial, that an acquittal was directed,
although Hadfield was retained in custody for disposition "for the
safety of society." 2' The following excerpts from Erskine's speech
indicate his view of the insanity defense:
I must convince you, not only that the unhappy prisoner was a
lunatic, within my own definition of lunacy, but that the act in
question was the IMMEDIATE, UNQUALIFIED OFFSPRING
OF THE DISEASE .... [Tihe relation between the disease
and, the act should be apparent.
But it is said, that whatever delusions may overshadow the
mind, every person ought to be responsible for crimes, who has
the knowledge of good and evil. . . . [T]he knowledge of good
and evil is too general a description. . . . [Y]our province
today will, therefore, be, to decide, whether the prisoner, when
he did the act, was under the uncontrollable dominion of insan-
ity, and was impelled to it by a morbid delusion; or whether it
was an act of a man, who, though occasionally mad, or even at
the time not perfectly collected, was yet not actuated by the
disease, but by the suggestion of a wicked and malignant dispo-
sition."
Here is an outright rejection of the "right and wrong" standard
18. 8 Eng. Rep. at 722-23.
19. 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800).
20. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
21. Hadlield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1354 (1800).
22. Id. a 1314-19 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 26
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and an emphasis on the effect of delusion. In this regard, however,
it should be noted that the defendant, Hadfield, was allegedly
obsessed with the idea that he must give his life for the salvation
of the world and shot at King George III hoping to be executed
in order to fulfill this supposed role. Thus, Erskine was obviously
tailoring his defense to the facts of his case. It is probably safe to
conclude that "Hadfield's acquittal was not a judicial adoption
of delusion as the test in the place of knowledge of right and
wrong [but was undoubtedly] an instance of the bewildering
effect of Erskine's adroitness, rhetoric and eloquence."' '
At this point, it is certainly not at all clear whether the "right
and wrong" test being employed by the pre-M'Naghten cases in
England was concerned with the offender's knowledge of right
and wrong in the abstract or as to the particular act charged. Two
other pre-M'Naghten cases, however, weigh heavily in favor of
the M'Naghten judges' determination. In Rex v. Offord2 the jury
was told that the question was: "[Did [the accused] know that
he was committing an offence against the laws of God and na-
ture?"2 5 Finally, in Regina v. Oxford,26 just three years before
M'Naghten, Lord Denman instructed the jury:
On the part of the defence it is contended, that the prisoner at
the bar was non compos mentis, that is (as it has been said),
unable to distinguish right from wrong, or, in other words, that
from the effect of a diseased mind he did not know at the time
that the act he did was wrong. . . [Tihe question will be,
whether all that has been proved about the prisoner at the bar
shews that he was insane at the time when the act was done -
whether the evidence given proves a disease in the mind as of a
person quite incapable of distinguishing right from wrong ...
The question is, whether the prisoner was labouring under that
species of insanity which satisfies you that he was quite unaware
of the nature, character, and consequences of the act he was
committing, or, in other words, whether he was under the influ-
ence of a diseased mind, and was really unconscious at the time
he was committing the act, that it was a crime.27
This instruction is precisely the type of instruction which has so
2:3. H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 58 (1954), quoting from
State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 434 (1869).
24. 172 Eng. Rep. 924 (K.B. 1831).
25. Id. at 925.
26. 17:3 Eng. Rep. 941 (Q.B. 1840).
27. Id. at 950 (emphasis added).
19741
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confused the issue, for us at least, if not for the English juries of
the time. In fact Lord Denman at one point actually stated both
formulations of the "right and wrong" test as though they were
the same. In other words, being able to distinguish right from
wrong meant being able to "know at the time that the act he did
was wrong." 28
The conclusion is inescapable that, prior to M'Naghten,
explanations of the insanity defense varied considerably from
case to case, and instructions in a single case sometimes included
glaringly contradictory guidelines. As early as 1724, however, in
Arnold's Case," there is support for the assertion that the courts
contemplated the use of a "right and wrong" formula applied
with regard to the particular act charged. On the other hand, if
Ferrers' Case:" in 1760 is considered to be the genesis of the "right
and wrong" standard, then the offender's knowledge of right and
wrong in the abstract may have prevailed for a time, although the
explanation in that case is also subject to conflicting interpreta-
tions. Finally, even assuming that Ferrers' Case made use of the
abstract standard, later cases such as Offord and Oxford would
seem to dictate the M'Naghten view. Thus, M'Naghten may be
seen simply as the culmination of a series of attempts to solidify
British thinking on the troublesome insanity issue. M'Naghten's
unequivocal recognition of the "right and wrong" standard as an
established rule and the national attention it attracted at the
time, make it a case of special significance.3' With its sharp focus
on the offender's ability to know right from wrong with respect
to the particular act charged, M'Naghten clarified and brought
order out of existing but confusing precedent and produced a
distinct, workable rule from which the more modern tests for
insanity have evolved. While the historical importance of
M'Naghten and its value as precedent can certainly not be de-
nied, the insanity test announced there was by no means a revolu-
tionary development.
28. id.
29. 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724). See notes 8 and 9 supra and accompanying text.
:10. 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760). See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
:1. See generaly H. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY ASA DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES 24-25 (1933):
"I'Tlhe first reason for the important position which M'Naghten's Case has obtained in
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